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Abstract
We provide eld experimental evidence of the e¤ects of monitoring in
a context where productivity is multi-dimensional and only one dimension
is monitored and incentivised. We hire students to do a job for us. The
job consists of identifying euro coins. We study the e¤ects of monitoring
and penalising mistakes on work quality, and evaluate spillovers on non-
incentivised dimensions of productivity (punctuality and theft). We nd
that monitoring improves work quality only if incentives are large, but
reduces punctuality substantially irrespectively of the size of incentives.
Monitoring does not a¤ect theft, with ten per cent of participants stealing
overall. Our setting also allows us to disentangle between possible theo-
retical mechanisms driving the adverse e¤ects of monitoring. Our ndings
are supportive of a reciprocity mechanism, whereby workers retaliate for
being distrusted.
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1 Introduction
Experts estimate that globally occupational fraud causes annual losses of more
than $3.5 trillion (Association of Certied Fraud Examiners, 2012). The ques-
tion is what an organisation can do to prevent such behaviour. One straight-
forward instrument to think of is monitoring workers and incentivising conform
behaviour. However, monitoring may entail negative crowding out e¤ects (see
Frey, 1993 and Falk and Kosfeld, 2006 for reviews of this literature). In a typi-
cal work-relation productivity is multi-dimensional and there are multiple ways
in which workers can behave counterproductively: From showing up late to
do sloppy work, stealing, bullying or sabotaging other peoples work, counter-
productive behavior has many possible facets. Thus, crowding out e¤ects may
spill over to other non-monitored productivity dimensions. One important ques-
tion is how monitoring a¤ects the monitored and non-monitored productivity
dimensions and ultimately whether monitoring is e¢ cient or not.
So far, the experimental evidence on the e¤ect of monitoring relates to situ-
ations where productivity is operationalised with a single measure, such as for
example the number of units produced or sold, performance at a test or mon-
etary transfers in an experimental game (see for example Nagin et al., 2002;
Fisman and Miguel, 2007; Boly, 2011; Dickinson and Villeval, 2008; Gneezy and
Rustichini, 2000; Falk and Kosfeld, 2006). We contribute to this research in
studying an experimental setup with multiple observable dimensions of produc-
tivity. Studying monitoring in a setting with multiple productivity dimensions
allows us to uncover negative spillover e¤ects of monitoring and to disentangle
between di¤erent mechanisms driving these crowding out e¤ects.
The eld experimental setup we use is related to the euro currency. We
recruit students to identifying the provenance of euro coins. Every worker re-
ceives four boxes of coins and is asked to identify and return the coins by an
appointed date. The task has the advantage of o¤ering a menu of observable
forms of counterproductive behaviours that are very common in the workplace,
i.e. sloppy work, tardiness and theft. These forms of counterproductive behav-
2
iour vary in their nature and perhaps, importantly, in the non-monetary (or
moral) costs associated with them (Robinson and Bennett, 1995).
We compare three treatments with di¤erent degrees of monitoring and incen-
tives. A rst treatment (no monitoring) entails no monitoring at all, a second
treatment (lax monitoring & weak incentives) introduces monitoring with weak
incentives and the third treatment (strict monitoring & strong incentives) intro-
duces monitoring with strong incentives. Comparing results across treatments,
we are able to di¤erentiate between di¤erent mechanisms driving the e¤ects of
monitoring and incentives on work behaviour. Specically we can disentangle
between a disciplining e¤ect (Becker, 1968; Grasmik and Bursik, 1990), recipro-
cal reactions (Frey, 1993; Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger, 2004) and information
e¤ects (Bénabou and Tirole, 2003; Sliwka, 2007).
We nd a positive disciplining e¤ect only when incentives are strong. Weak
incentives lead to no improvement in work quality at all, while strong incen-
tives reduce the number of mistakes by 40%. However, we also nd evidence
for negative spillover e¤ects, which appear as soon as monitoring is introduced.
Specically, we nd that tardiness increases substantially: the fraction of partic-
ipants who show up late increases by 35% as soon as monitoring is implemented
and the magnitude of the increase is similar in both incentive treatments. Theft,
on the other hand, remains constant across treatments: On average, 10% of the
participants steal coins. Our results are most supportive of an interpretation
related to negative reciprocity, whereby workers wish to punish the principal
(for distrusting them) and do so in the least costly manner for themselves (both
in monetary and non-monetary terms).
Overall, our experimental results suggest that monitoring and incentives can
only be e¢ cient if the incentives are strong. Whether or not monitoring with
strong incentives is e¢ cient depends on the ratio of the gains in the monitored
productivity dimension to the losses in other non-monitored productivity di-
mensions.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. We present the experimental
design in Section 2 and derive predictions in Section 3. We discuss the results
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in Section 4 and conclude in Section 5.
2 Experimental design
The job consisted of identifying the value and country of origin of euro coins
that were collected in various countries in the euro zone.1 Participants had a
day to complete the task and were supposed to return the materials by a specic
deadline. The job has several methodological advantages. It is a "realistic" job,
i.e. it is a job that could realistically be advertised by an economics department.
The job has multiple dimensions of productivity that arise naturally: Partici-
pants could do a poor job, be late in completing the job or steal some of the
coins. Still, it is straightforward for us to design a monitoring scheme targeting
only one of these dimensions. Also, participants who failed to comply in either
of these three dimensions can be categorised as behaving counterproductively,
since we made sure that it is possible for participants to do a perfect job.
2.1 Procedure
Each participant received a set of 4 boxes of euro coins collected in 4 di¤erent
countries of the euro zone. The lid of each box indicated the country the coins
were collected in. Within one set, the composition of boxes, with respect to the
value and the number of coins varied. Across sets, however, the composition of
boxes was similar. Each participant received a total of 780 coins with a value
of e114.70.
We recruited student workers via a notice posted at various points on cam-
pus. Students contacted us by e-mail and were invited to collect the materials
(each of them came separately). At collection, each participant received stan-
dardised verbal instructions on how to do the job. All participants received
1There are currently 17 countries (out of 28 members of the European Union) and three
European microstates (Vatican, San Marino and Monaco) that use the euro as their currency.
There are 8 euro coin denominations, ranging from one cent to two euro. The coins rst came
into use in 2002. They have a common reverse, but each country in the eurozone has its
own design on the obverse, which means that each coin has a variety of di¤erent designs in
circulation at once. For a detailed description of this task see Belot and Schröder (2013).
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a catalogue illustrating the popular euro coins and four identication tables.2
Using the catalogue, participants were told to identify each coin by indicating
the value and the country it was printed in on the identication table.
Participants were told to identify all coins in each box and were asked to
work on one box at a time and to put all coins back into the box once identied.
They were told to use a separate identication table for each box and to indicate
the country of collection (as indicated in the lid of the box) on the identica-
tion table. In the monitoring treatments, we informed participants about the
number of boxes that would be checked, the tolerated number of mistakes and
the penalty they would incur if the number of mistakes exceeded the tolerated
number. Participants were informed about the payment they would receive
upon returning the materials and the remaining payment they would receive if
they met the quality requirement. If participants had no further questions, we
asked them to indicate the exact time at which they would return the coins the
next day.3 Participants were informed that the process of returning coins and
collecting payment would only take one minute.
All participants were allowed to take the material with them to work from
home. When a participant returned the coins, we noted the exact time the
material was returned. We also asked the participants for an estimate of the
time they had worked on the task, for their eld of study and we recorded the
gender.
We checked all returned materials with respect to coin composition and
mistakes in the identication task. Whenever we observed deviations in the
composition of coins, we replaced coins by identical coins or coins with similar
collectors value before handing the materials to the next participant. In the
monitoring treatments, participants were informed whether they had met the
work quality requirement and could collect the remaining amount of money.
2The catalogue and the tables did not include special coins and coins from the microstates
Monaco, San Marino and the Vatican. If any box contained such a coin, participants were
told to identify the coin as "not in the catalogue."
3We gave participants enough time to check their calendar for the best suitable time in the
time horizon between 3:30 p.m. and 6:00 p.m. Once a participant had decided on the exact
return time, we wrote the time on a sheet of paper handed out to the participant.
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2.2 Treatments
Table 1 summarises the three treatments of the experiment. In the no mon-
itoring treatment, there was no monitoring at all. When returning the work
material, participants in the no monitoring treatment immediately received the
full payment of e20 in cash. In both monitoring treatments, participants knew
that 1 out of the 4 boxes would be checked after returning the coins. In the
monitoring & weak incentives treatment participants were allowed to make 10
mistakes. If we found more than 10 mistakes in the box randomly chosen for
checking, the participant would only receive e19 instead of e20. In the mon-
itoring & strong incentives treatment, the tolerated number of mistakes was
only 2. If we found more than 2 mistakes in the checked box, the participants
payment was only e5 instead of e20. Participants receive the sure part of the
payment rst and could collect the remaining part later (usually a day later) if
they met the work quality requirements.
Table 1 Treatments of the experiment
no. of boxes checked tolerated no. of mistakes penalty
no monitoring 0 - -
monitoring & weak incentives 1 10 e1
monitoring & strong incentives 1 2 e15
2.3 Sample
Overall, 91 students participated in this study, 30 in the no monitoring and
monitoring & weak incentives treatments and 31 in the monitoring & strong
incentives treatment. We recruited participants via a notice posted at various
points on campus. The notice informed students that we needed support for
a research project in economics, that all students could participate, that the
task would last for 2 to 3 hours and could be fullled from home, and that
the average payment was e20. Interested students were asked to contact the
research team via mail. Those students who had not participated in any previous
related studies, received a response mail shortly explaining the task. Further,
we suggested two collection dates with the corresponding return dates and asked
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students to choose one date and to indicate at what time they would collect the
working material.4
3 Predictions
We now derive predictions of how monitoring and incentives may a¤ect behav-
iour in this setting. Importantly, our goal is to be able to disentangle between
the di¤erent mechanisms that have been proposed in the literature.
We assume that workers are risk neutral and that the correct identication
of coins and punctuality require the provision of costly e¤ort. In the absence
of monitoring, standard economic theory predicts that workers provide zero
e¤ort (both in the identication task and in punctuality) and steal all the coins.
However, it is often observed that workers provide positive e¤ort even when they
have no monetary incentive to do so. We will focus on two possible explanations
on why workers provide e¤ort that have been proposed in the literature. The
rst explanation has to do with other-regarding preferences. An inequity averse
or altruistic worker, for example, may care both about her own and about the
principals payo¤ (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; Andreoni and Miller, 2002). To
increase the principals payo¤, an other-regarding worker may provide e¤ort in
the identication task, show up on time and return all coins.
The second explanation for why workers provide e¤ort even when this is not
monetarily benecial has to do with social norms. Doing a proper job, showing
up on time and returning the coins are associated with social norms that are
costly to violate. It is interesting to point out that these costs of violating norms
may di¤er across productivity dimensions. We conjecture that showing up late
is not as costly as theft, which is in fact illegal (Robinson and Bennett, 1995).
Now, let us turn to the possible e¤ects of introducing monitoring. The
standard e¤ect predicted by principal agent models is the disciplining e¤ect.
Following the prediction of standard economic theory, monitoring and incentives
e¤ectively increase the marginal benet of providing e¤ort in the monitored
4Collection was always in the morning between 10:00 a.m. and 12:30 p.m. and return was
the next day between 3:30 p.m. and 6:00 p.m.
7
productivity dimension. Therefore, work quality should increase in the level of
monitoring and incentives (Becker, 1968).
In a context with multiple productivity dimensions, monitoring one pro-
ductivity dimension may additionally lead to a shift of e¤ort away from non-
monitored dimensions and towards the monitored dimension (Holmstrom and
Milgrom, 1991; Baker, 1992). This distortion e¤ect only applies if e¤orts as-
sociated with di¤erent productivity dimensions are substitutes. In the context
of our job, it is plausible that doing the task well and showing up on time are
substitutes. Doing the identication task well presumably requires more time
and may therefore make it harder for workers to complete the task on time. On
the other hand, sloppy work and theft are unlikely to be substitutes. So the
rst prediction we propose is the following:
Prediction 1 (disciplining e¤ect) - Monitoring and incentives will increase
e¤ort in the monitored dimension and have negative spillover e¤ects on dimen-
sions for which e¤orts are substitutes.
That is, we would expect monitoring to reduce sloppy work, possibly increase
tardiness and to have no e¤ect on theft.
Monitoring and incentives may also have a crowding-out e¤ect on intrinsic
motivation. One mechanism driving this crowding-out is through reciprocity.
For a given level of e¤ort, monitoring and incentives e¤ectively reduce the ex-
pected payo¤ of a worker. Indeed, in the absence of monitoring, workers get the
full payment for sure, while in the presence of monitoring, they only get it with
a probability (which is lower or equal to 1). Compared to the no monitoring
treatment, workers in the two monitoring treatments also infer additional costs
because they have to collect the sure payo¤ and, if applicable, the remaining
payo¤ at di¤erent dates. Workers may want to reduce the principals payo¤ in
order to reciprocate this reduction in their own expected payo¤ (Rabin, 1993;
Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger, 2004). If reciprocity is due to a reduction in ex-
pected payo¤, we expect the negative e¤ect of monitoring and incentives to be
increasing in the level of monitoring and incentives.
Monitoring and incentives (independent of the level) may also be perceived
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as a signal of distrust and workers may reciprocate this distrust by caring less
about the utility of the principal (Frey, 1993). If reciprocity is due to distrust,
we expect the negative e¤ect of monitoring to be independent of the level of
monitoring and incentives.
In a multi-dimensional context, we expect workers to pick the least costly
manner to retaliate. There are three ways in which workers can retaliate: (1)
they can put less e¤ort, (2) they can steal coins, (3) they can be late in returning
the work material.5 If they put less e¤ort in the monitored task, they also get
paid less in expectation. If they retaliate through other dimensions, they incur
no monetary costs (in the case of theft they even incur a monetary gain), but
may infer costs associated to breaking social norms. We conjecture that the
costs of theft are higher than the costs of tardiness (due to a strong social and
legal norm). Thus, the prediction we associate with reciprocity is the following:
Prediction 2 (reciprocity) - Monitoring will not a¤ect or may improve pro-
ductivity in the monitored dimension (work quality), but will increase tardiness.
If workers reciprocate a reduction in monetary payo¤, we expect the negative
e¤ect of monitoring to increase in the level of monitoring, i.e. to be highest
in the monitoring & strong incentives treatment. If workers reciprocate being
distrusted, we expect the negative e¤ect of monitoring to be independent of the
level of monitoring and incentives.
Another mechanism that has been proposed to explain crowding out e¤ects
is through information. There are two theories of what information monitoring
could reveal. The rst by Bénabou and Tirole (2003), who argue that monitoring
could serve as a signal of task di¢ culty. Workers who are monitored infer that
the task is di¢ cult and as a consequence put less e¤ort into it (Bénabou and
Tirole, 2003). In a multi-dimensional e¤ect, this would generate positive spill-
overs on the dimensions that are close substitutes. We therefore predict the
following:
Prediction 3 (information about task di¢ culty) - If monitoring provides in-
5All of the experiments were conducted by the authors of this paper. Thus, tardiness
is associated with costs to the authority deciding on monitoring mechanisms and can be
considered as a method of reciprocating.
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formation about the task di¢ culty to workers, monitoring should decrease work
quality. Substitution e¤ects may lead to a decrease in tardiness, while theft is
not a¤ected by monitoring.
Sliwka (2007) proposes that monitoring could reveal information about the
peersbehaviour. In his model, monitoring signals the principals expectations
of the workers propensity to behave counterproductively. Thus, monitoring
work quality could signal that the principal expects a large fraction of workers
to work sloppily. Workers who aim at behaving conform to their peers respond
to this signal and choose to behave counterproductively as well, that is, they will
also work sloppily. But how does this a¤ect counterproductive behaviour in the
other dimensions? The signal is obviously directly relevant for the dimension
that is monitored, but the question is whether monitoring could also give a signal
to workers about their peerspropensity to show up late or steal. This will very
much depend on whether there is a positive correlation in behaviour across the
di¤erent dimensions. If people believe that showing up late and stealing money
are correlated with doing a bad job at the identication task, then it could be
that monitoring one dimension (work quality) provides information about the
behaviour of the peers along the other dimensions as well.
Prediction 4 (information about peers) - If monitoring provides information
about peers, monitoring should decrease work quality but may also increase tar-
diness and theft.
It is worth pointing out that it is the multi-dimensional aspect of productiv-
ity, combined with the asymmetric monitoring, that allows us to di¤erentiate
between these mechanisms. In a standard set up with only one dimension of pro-
ductivity, we would only observe the net e¤ect of monitoring (disciplining minus
crowding out e¤ects) and we would not be able to say whether the crowding
e¤ects are driven by negative reciprocity or by information.
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4 Results
4.1 Summary statistics
Table 2 shows summary statistics for the behaviours of interest across the three
treatments. First, the quality of work is on average better in the monitoring &
strong incentives treatment than in the no monitoring and monitoring & weak
incentives treatments. In fact, quality in the no monitoring and the monitoring
& weak incentives treatments is very similar. In these two treatments, workers
make 10 mistakes on average, while they make on average 7 mistakes in the
monitoring & strong incentives treatment. The proportion of workers making
more than 10 mistakes is largest in the monitoring treatment with weak incen-
tives (30%), followed by the no monitoring treatment (23%) and is lowest in the
monitoring & strong incentives treatment (16%). These results indicate that
monitoring only improves work quality when the incentives are high enough.
Second, tardiness varies substantially across treatments. The average delay
is larger and the average advance smaller in the two monitoring treatments
compared to the no monitoring treatment. The average delay is highest in the
monitoring & strong incentives treatment.
Finally, 10% of the participants (9 people out of 91) steal money. Overall, it
seems that theft is motivated by the collectorsvalue of coins, rather than the
nominal value of circulating coins. Subjects especially steal coins that are only
rarely found in Germany, such as coins from the Vatican, Slovenia, or Slovakia.
These are coins that have a higher collectorsvalue than their actual nominal
value. For example, in three cases a 50 cent coin from the Vatican is stolen. On
the German ebay platform this coin is sold for e3 (plus shipping). In two cases
subjects replaced coins with a higher collectorsvalue by other coins with the
same nominal value. We categorise these acts as theft as they did not inform us
that they replaced the coins. In addition to the two coins that were replaced, 12
coins were stolen, resulting in a nominal loss of e1.53. We observe no variation
in the prevalence of theft across treatments.
We do not observe a signicant correlation between the di¤erent forms of
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counterproductive behaviour. Comparing individuals who steal to those who do
not steal, we do not detect any signicant di¤erence in tardiness (U-test, p>0.10,
two-tailed) or the number of mistakes (U-test, p>0.10, two-tailed). Further, we
nd a positive but insignicant correlation between the number of mistakes and
the delay in minutes (Spearman Correlation, =0.144, p=0.17, two-tailed).
Table 2 Summary of the results
no monitoring
monitoring &
weak incentives
monitoring &
strong incentives
Work quality
avg. no. of mistakes 10.23 (16.23) 9.97 (13.45) 6.90 (10.93)
no. of subjects with 0-2 mistakes 37% 40% 35%
no. of subjects with 3 mistakes or more 63% 60% 65%
no. of subjects with 10 mistakes or more 23% 30% 16%
Tardiness
avg. delay in minutes 0.77 (6.29) 4.63 (15.48) 9.84 (38.93)
avg. advance in minutes 152.60 (584.90) 7.50 (17.04) 26.29 (130.31)
Theft
no. of subjects who stole coins 3 3 3
Work time
avg. work time in minutes 111.83 (42.58) 112.50 (45.04) 124.45 (47.69)
Mean values with standard deviation in parenthesis.
4.2 Regression analysis
We now turn to a regression analysis of the number of mistakes and tardiness
(we do not analyse theft since there is no variation across treatments), which
allows us to control for some observable characteristics of the workers. Starting
with work quality, Col. (1) shows the results of a Poisson regression.6 We nd
that there are 40% less mistakes under the monitoring & strong incentives treat-
ment than under no monitoring. On the other hand, we observe no signicant
di¤erences between monitoring & weak incentives and no monitoring.
We nd that the time di¤erence (i.e. di¤erence between the actual and
the appointed return time) is signicantly larger in both monitoring treatments
compared to the treatment without monitoring (Col. (2)). One question here is
6The distribution of the number of mistakes is not normal. There is a substantial fraction
of zeros and small positive values. In those cases, count data models are more appropriate.
This is why we use a Poisson regression.
12
whether the di¤erence is driven by a distortion e¤ect, i.e. workers show up late
because they put more e¤ort into the identication task. We asked participants
how much time they spent on the task and the average reported working time
was 112 minutes for the no monitoring treatment, 113 minutes for the monitor-
ing & weak incentives treatment and 124 minutes for the monitoring & strong
incentives, with none of these di¤erences being statistically signicant (U-test,
p>0.10, two-tailed). We nd that di¤erences between treatments with respect
to punctuality exist even when controlling for the total number of mistakes and
the reported work time (Col. (3)). There is some evidence that part of the delay
in the monitoring & strong incentives treatment could be due to extra care in
the task (the di¤erence in delay falls from 143 minutes to 132 minutes, which
corresponds exactly to the additional amount of time spent on the task.) But
neither the total number of mistakes, nor the reported working time appear to
be correlated with the delay at all.
Col. (4-7) look at the probability of completing the task early or late. We
only nd signicant di¤erences in the probability of being late. Participants are
35% and 36% more likely to be late under monitoring & weak incentives and
monitoring & strong incentives, respectively. The e¤ects of monitoring remains
identical if we control for the total number of mistakes and the reported work
time (Col. 5 and 7), which shows that there is no relationship between e¤ort in
the identication task and tardiness. Thus, our results are most supportive of a
reciprocity interpretation. Workers perceive monitoring as unkind and retaliate
by putting less e¤ort in the dimension that is the least costly for themselves
(both in monetary and non-monetary terms). Since we nd that the extent of
retaliation is independent of the strength of the incentives, it seems that workers
respond more to the mere presence of a monitoring technology than to the loss
in expected monetary terms. It does not matter how strong the incentives are,
the workers just dislike being distrusted.
One important question is whether it pays to monitor workers. Clearly, this
is not the case when we compare monitoring & weak incentives to no monitor-
ing. There are no signicant di¤erences in the quality of work and tardiness
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increases with monitoring. Introducing monitoring with strong incentives, on
the other hand, improves work quality, but also increases tardiness. In that
case, depending on the opportunity cost of time, it could be that monitoring
pays o¤.
Table 3 Regression analysis
Number of
mistakes
(Poisson)
Time
di¤erence
(OLS)
Early
(Probit)
Late
(Probit)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
monitoring & weak .003 145.754 145.154 -.137 -.136 .348 .356
(.082) (65.137)*** (64.896)** (.119) (.119) (.132)** (.132)***
monitoring & strong -.407 143.140 131.754 -.105 .066 .363 .389
(.089)*** (64.791)*** (65.157)** (.120) (.106) (.129)*** (.131)***
female -.298 37.005 36.556 .070 .066 .000 .015
(.074)*** (54.098) (53.897) (.105) (.106) (.103) (.104)
total mistakes - - 1.341 - -.001 - .005
(1.997) (.004) (.004)
reported work time - - .772 - .000 - .000
(.602) (.001) (.001)
constant 2.435 -185.343 -266.523 - -
(.062)*** (55.355)*** (83.951)***
(Pseudo) R2 .027 .082 .047 .014 .016 .081 .098
**signicance at p<0.05, ***signicance at p<0.001
Marginal e¤ects are reported for Probit estimates in Col. (4)-(7)
5 Discussion and conclusions
This paper provides eld evidence on the e¤ect of monitoring in a context where
productivity is multi-dimensional and only one of the dimensions (work quality)
is monitored. We nd that introducing monitoring with weak incentives is
ine¢ cient. There is no signicant improvement in work quality and tardiness
increases signicantly. Monitoring with strong incentives is more e¤ective. The
number of mistakes falls substantially, but at the same time the adverse e¤ects
on the other dimensions are as large as in the monitoring treatment with weak
incentives.
Overall, these results are in line with a model of reciprocal behaviour. Work-
ers choose to punish the principal for monitoring (and therefore distrusting)
them, but choose to do this through dimensions that have low costs for them.
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Theft is presumably much more costly to the workers (in moral terms) than
tardiness and putting less e¤ort in the monitored task involves direct costs.
Tardiness on the other hand does not involve high moral costs and has no -
nancial consequences for the workers.
Based on these results, we conclude that introducing a monitoring technology
only pays o¤ if (1) the incentives associated with passing the checks are high
and (2) the dimensions that cannot be monitored either entail high moral costs
or the relative gains in productivity in the monitored dimension more than
compensate for the losses in other dimensions.
These ndings relate more broadly to the literature on adverse e¤ects of
incentives (see Gneezy et al., 2011 for a recent review) and the adverse e¤ects of
control (Falk and Kosfeld, 2006) and monitoring (Frey, 1993). In line with this
literature, we nd that weak monitoring and weak incentives are less e¤ective
than no monitoring and no incentives.
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